DPIA + ROPA

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DPIA + ROPA — sign.online EUDI Wallet pilot

Draft for legal reviewProduced 2026-11-18 · Controller: SIGN.ONLINE OÜ, Tallinn, Estonia · Author: engineering

This document combines a Record of Processing Activities (GDPR Art. 30) and a Data Protection Impact Assessment (GDPR Art. 35). It covers the sandbox pilot deployed at https://eudi.sign.online/. Live production processing needs a refreshed DPIA before go-live.

1. Controller + contact

ControllerSIGN.ONLINE OÜ · Lõõtsa tn 2a, 11415 Tallinn, Estonia · Estonian Commercial Register code 16518242
Management boardMartin Nørgaard Gregersen
Contacthello@sign.online
DPO / privacy contactprivacy@sign.online (to be confirmed)
ProcessorAmazon Web Services EMEA SARL (eu-central-1 Frankfurt)
Sub-processorsCloudflare (DNS only); d-trust GmbH (PID issuer — Bundesdruckerei sandbox); eudi-wallet.gov.de (RP registrar)
EU transfersNone. All processing in eu-central-1.

2. Purpose + lawful basis

Processing activityPurposeLawful basis (Art. 6)
Signer identity verification via EUDI Wallet (OpenID4VP)Verifying the named signer is who the uploader says they are, so the signed document has evidentiary valueArt. 6(1)(f) legitimate interest
Issuing a signing certificate (OpenID4VCI)Giving the signer a wallet-stored, verifiable attestation of the document they signedArt. 6(1)(f) legitimate interest
Invitation + result emailsNotifying the signer and the uploader about a pending or completed signing roundArt. 6(1)(b) performance of a contract
Operational logging (CloudWatch)Debugging, security monitoringArt. 6(1)(f) legitimate interest

No special-category data (Art. 9) is processed. The three PID fields (given_name, family_name, birthdate) are personal data but not sensitive.

3. Categories of data subjects + data

SubjectData collected
Uploader (sign.online operator or forwarded starter)Email address
SignerFull name, date of birth, email address (for multi-signer rounds), IP address of wallet callback, wallet key thumbprint, SHA-256 of the signed PDF
PID issuerX.509 certificate chain, status-list fetches (public anyway)

4. Retention + deletion

DataWhereRetention
Uploaded PDFS3, CMK-encrypted7 days (lifecycle); operator can "delete now"
Session (PID claims, wallet response)DynamoDB, CMK-encrypted, PITR on1 hour TTL
Round + signer invitationsDynamoDB7 days TTL
Signature record (hash + timestamps)S3 signatures/<ref>.json7 days lifecycle; operator can "delete now"
Application + API Gateway logs (incl. source IPs)CloudWatch Logs, CMK-encrypted7 days retention
S3 object-access logsS3 access-log bucket7 days lifecycle
Secrets (certificates, passwords)Secrets ManagerRotated manually; no PII
SES outbound email metadataAWS SES account history15 days (AWS default)
SES suppression list (bounce / complaint)SES account levelUntil operator removes

All retention is automatic. Versioning is on for S3; the "delete now" endpoint lists every object version and deletes them explicitly so nothing lingers.

5. Data flows

Uploader browser ──HTTPS──► CloudFront ──HTTPS──► API Gateway ──► Lambda
                                                                   │
                                                                   ├── S3 (PDF, CMK-encrypted)
                                                                   ├── DynamoDB (sessions, CMK-encrypted)
                                                                   ├── Secrets Manager (certs, read only)
                                                                   └── SES (invite + result emails)
Signer EUDI Wallet ──HTTPS──► Lambda /oid4vp/* (public callback)
                           ◄── encrypted PID response (JWE); decrypted only in-memory

Nothing is sent outside eu-central-1 except:

6. Technical + organisational measures

7. Data-subject rights

RightHow exercised
Access (Art. 15)Request via privacy@sign.online. Operator dumps the DynamoDB rows + S3 record for the identified round.
Rectification (Art. 16)Not applicable — data fields are entered by the uploader for a single-round transaction and expire within 7 days.
Erasure (Art. 17)Automatic (7-day TTL) or on request via privacy@ — the operator uses the in-app "Delete this round's data now" button.
Restriction (Art. 18)Not applicable — processing is transactional, not ongoing.
Portability (Art. 20)The signer's wallet already holds their signing certificate (SD-JWT VC) and they export it from the wallet directly.
Objection (Art. 21)Request via privacy@. The operator cancels the pending round.
Automated decision-making (Art. 22)No fully-automated decisions. Verification is cryptographic; a human operator triggers each round.

8. Necessity + proportionality

Necessity: an authenticated signature requires knowing who signed. The EUDI Wallet exposes only the three fields necessary for that (given_name, family_name, birthdate) and the signer consents in-wallet before anything is shared.

Proportionality: no data besides what the wallet reveals is requested; the registration certificate restricts the three claims; nothing is stored longer than needed for the signing round.

9. Risks + residual risk

RiskLikelihoodImpactMitigationResidual
Compromise of the shared staff passwordlowmedium8-attempt-per-15-min rate limit; signer links are HMAC-bound and not usable to sign; "delete now" availablelow
Signer-link leakage (email forwarding)mediummediumIdentity match on three PID fields; 3-attempt cap; 7-day expirylow
PID provider compromiselowhighTrust anchor = only sandbox PID CAs during pilot; sign.online does not accept production PIDs until the German PID production anchor is publishedlow
Phishing using the sign.online brandmediummediumConfidentiality disclaimer in email; DKIM on email.sign.online; plain + HTML with raw link fallbackmedium
CloudWatch log leaklowlowCMK-encrypted, 7-day retention; logs do not include PID claimslow
Supplier (AWS) breachlowhighAWS GDPR DPA, SCCs under Art. 46, SOC2/ISO certificationslow

Residual risk is low. The DPIA concludes the processing is lawful and proportionate for the pilot scope.

10. Review

This DPIA must be re-evaluated before: production access (SES, real recipient volumes); any new data field requested from the wallet; a change in retention or deletion policy; expanding beyond the German sandbox (e.g. PIDs from other member states).

Next review: before pilot exits sandbox mode, or at the latest 2027-05-18.

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