DPIA + ROPA — sign.online EUDI Wallet pilot
This document combines a Record of Processing Activities (GDPR Art. 30) and a Data Protection Impact Assessment (GDPR Art. 35). It covers the sandbox pilot deployed at https://eudi.sign.online/. Live production processing needs a refreshed DPIA before go-live.
1. Controller + contact
| Controller | SIGN.ONLINE OÜ · Lõõtsa tn 2a, 11415 Tallinn, Estonia · Estonian Commercial Register code 16518242 |
|---|---|
| Management board | Martin Nørgaard Gregersen |
| Contact | hello@sign.online |
| DPO / privacy contact | privacy@sign.online (to be confirmed) |
| Processor | Amazon Web Services EMEA SARL (eu-central-1 Frankfurt) |
| Sub-processors | Cloudflare (DNS only); d-trust GmbH (PID issuer — Bundesdruckerei sandbox); eudi-wallet.gov.de (RP registrar) |
| EU transfers | None. All processing in eu-central-1. |
2. Purpose + lawful basis
| Processing activity | Purpose | Lawful basis (Art. 6) |
|---|---|---|
| Signer identity verification via EUDI Wallet (OpenID4VP) | Verifying the named signer is who the uploader says they are, so the signed document has evidentiary value | Art. 6(1)(f) legitimate interest |
| Issuing a signing certificate (OpenID4VCI) | Giving the signer a wallet-stored, verifiable attestation of the document they signed | Art. 6(1)(f) legitimate interest |
| Invitation + result emails | Notifying the signer and the uploader about a pending or completed signing round | Art. 6(1)(b) performance of a contract |
| Operational logging (CloudWatch) | Debugging, security monitoring | Art. 6(1)(f) legitimate interest |
No special-category data (Art. 9) is processed. The three PID fields (given_name, family_name, birthdate) are personal data but not sensitive.
3. Categories of data subjects + data
| Subject | Data collected |
|---|---|
| Uploader (sign.online operator or forwarded starter) | Email address |
| Signer | Full name, date of birth, email address (for multi-signer rounds), IP address of wallet callback, wallet key thumbprint, SHA-256 of the signed PDF |
| PID issuer | X.509 certificate chain, status-list fetches (public anyway) |
4. Retention + deletion
| Data | Where | Retention |
|---|---|---|
| Uploaded PDF | S3, CMK-encrypted | 7 days (lifecycle); operator can "delete now" |
| Session (PID claims, wallet response) | DynamoDB, CMK-encrypted, PITR on | 1 hour TTL |
| Round + signer invitations | DynamoDB | 7 days TTL |
| Signature record (hash + timestamps) | S3 signatures/<ref>.json | 7 days lifecycle; operator can "delete now" |
| Application + API Gateway logs (incl. source IPs) | CloudWatch Logs, CMK-encrypted | 7 days retention |
| S3 object-access logs | S3 access-log bucket | 7 days lifecycle |
| Secrets (certificates, passwords) | Secrets Manager | Rotated manually; no PII |
| SES outbound email metadata | AWS SES account history | 15 days (AWS default) |
| SES suppression list (bounce / complaint) | SES account level | Until operator removes |
All retention is automatic. Versioning is on for S3; the "delete now" endpoint lists every object version and deletes them explicitly so nothing lingers.
5. Data flows
Uploader browser ──HTTPS──► CloudFront ──HTTPS──► API Gateway ──► Lambda
│
├── S3 (PDF, CMK-encrypted)
├── DynamoDB (sessions, CMK-encrypted)
├── Secrets Manager (certs, read only)
└── SES (invite + result emails)
Signer EUDI Wallet ──HTTPS──► Lambda /oid4vp/* (public callback)
◄── encrypted PID response (JWE); decrypted only in-memory
Nothing is sent outside eu-central-1 except:
- Email delivery (SES uses global infrastructure; metadata at rest is in AWS).
- PID trust anchor + CRL fetches (d-trust.net, public endpoints).
- CloudFront edge + WAFv2 (global AWS service — see SCCs under Art. 46 in the AWS DPA).
6. Technical + organisational measures
- End-to-end TLS 1.2+. CloudFront terminates TLS at the edge; origin traffic is HTTPS only.
- WAF: AWS Managed Rules (CommonRuleSet, KnownBadInputs, AnonymousIpList), rate limit 1,000 req / 5 min per IP.
- Encryption at rest: customer-managed KMS CMK, yearly rotation. S3 BucketKey + SSE-KMS; DynamoDB SSE-KMS; CloudWatch Logs encrypted with the same key.
- Access control: shared operator password on the staff UI; signer links use HMAC-signed tokens bound to a round + signer index.
- IAM least-privilege: scoped per-resource (one table, one bucket, one SES FromAddress, one KMS key).
- Reserved concurrency of 10 on the Lambda caps blast radius under abuse.
- 12 cryptographic verifications on every PID response (signature, trust chain, status list, holder binding, nonce, audience, disclosures, type, validity, claims, match, format).
- Audit trail: every request logged to CloudWatch (JSON, CMK-encrypted, 7-day retention).
- Deletion: automatic retention + operator "delete now" that purges every S3 version + all DynamoDB rows for the round.
- Point-in-time recovery on DynamoDB.
- No telemetry / analytics / third-party JS. One strictly-necessary session cookie, no consent banner required.
7. Data-subject rights
| Right | How exercised |
|---|---|
| Access (Art. 15) | Request via privacy@sign.online. Operator dumps the DynamoDB rows + S3 record for the identified round. |
| Rectification (Art. 16) | Not applicable — data fields are entered by the uploader for a single-round transaction and expire within 7 days. |
| Erasure (Art. 17) | Automatic (7-day TTL) or on request via privacy@ — the operator uses the in-app "Delete this round's data now" button. |
| Restriction (Art. 18) | Not applicable — processing is transactional, not ongoing. |
| Portability (Art. 20) | The signer's wallet already holds their signing certificate (SD-JWT VC) and they export it from the wallet directly. |
| Objection (Art. 21) | Request via privacy@. The operator cancels the pending round. |
| Automated decision-making (Art. 22) | No fully-automated decisions. Verification is cryptographic; a human operator triggers each round. |
8. Necessity + proportionality
Necessity: an authenticated signature requires knowing who signed. The EUDI Wallet exposes only the three fields necessary for that (given_name, family_name, birthdate) and the signer consents in-wallet before anything is shared.
Proportionality: no data besides what the wallet reveals is requested; the registration certificate restricts the three claims; nothing is stored longer than needed for the signing round.
9. Risks + residual risk
| Risk | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigation | Residual |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Compromise of the shared staff password | low | medium | 8-attempt-per-15-min rate limit; signer links are HMAC-bound and not usable to sign; "delete now" available | low |
| Signer-link leakage (email forwarding) | medium | medium | Identity match on three PID fields; 3-attempt cap; 7-day expiry | low |
| PID provider compromise | low | high | Trust anchor = only sandbox PID CAs during pilot; sign.online does not accept production PIDs until the German PID production anchor is published | low |
| Phishing using the sign.online brand | medium | medium | Confidentiality disclaimer in email; DKIM on email.sign.online; plain + HTML with raw link fallback | medium |
| CloudWatch log leak | low | low | CMK-encrypted, 7-day retention; logs do not include PID claims | low |
| Supplier (AWS) breach | low | high | AWS GDPR DPA, SCCs under Art. 46, SOC2/ISO certifications | low |
Residual risk is low. The DPIA concludes the processing is lawful and proportionate for the pilot scope.
10. Review
This DPIA must be re-evaluated before: production access (SES, real recipient volumes); any new data field requested from the wallet; a change in retention or deletion policy; expanding beyond the German sandbox (e.g. PIDs from other member states).
Next review: before pilot exits sandbox mode, or at the latest 2027-05-18.